Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992]
What are the facts of the case?
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] was a test case which arose out of the Hillsborough disaster which occurred at Hillsborough Football Stadium on April 15th, 1989. It concerned claims brought by friends and relatives of people who were injured or killed at the stadium during the incident. For example, parents, brothers, brothers-in-law, and unofficial fiancés.
The facts of the case varies because different people were involved. When the incident occurred, the plaintiffs-that is the relatives of the injured- were in different locations. Two were in the ground at Hillsborough but were not in the pen where the disaster occurred, and some were outside the stadium. The other eight claimants learned of the disaster through television and radio broadcasts. Some had seen the events live or on recorded TV coverage. Some had identified bodies in the makeshift mortuary after the event.
The plaintiffs claimed seeing their relatives in the incident, and in some cases after the incident, had caused them psychiatric injury. They claimed damages from the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police for this injury.
In court, they argued that the only requirement for liability for nervous shock was reasonable foreseeability of risk of injury. In other words, for them to be successful with their claims it was only necessary to demonstrate that it was reasonably foreseeable that they would be injured as a result of the defendant’s negligence.
What did the House of Lords decide?
In response, the House of Lords said the requirement for liability for psychiatric injury was not just foreseeability. They confirmed that there are different requirements for primary and secondary victims. For secondary victims, which the plaintiffs were classed as, they put in place certain control mechanisms that needed to be passed in order for a successful claim for liability for damages for psychiatric injury. The control mechanisms are as follows:
1.Proximity of Relationship
The claimant has to establish a ‘close tie of love and affection’.
The law presumes that parent-child, spousal relationships and relationships involving people engaged to be married have close enough ties for the purposes of the law. However, in other relationships, this is not presumed. For example, in relationships between siblings. In such relationships, the claimant can rebut the presumption through demonstration of the closeness of their relationship.
2.Proximity in time and space
The House of Lords confirmed the aftermath principle which was outlined in McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983]. Therefore, the plaintiff should have either been present at the actual scene of the accident or they could have viewed the immediate aftermath of the accident. Either will be sufficient for the test of proximity in time and space. However, in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992], the claimants who had seen their loved ones in the mortuary 9 hours after the incident did not meet the test for proximity in time and space.
3.Proximity of Perception
The claimant must suffer psychiatric injury as a result of directly hearing or seeing the accident or its immediate aftermath. As previously confirmed in Ravenscroft v Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic [1992], there is no liability if the claimant is told about the accident by a third party.
In Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] the House of Lords denied that the experience of watching the events live on TV was equivalent to direct perception of those events. Even though plaintiffs Mr and Mrs. Copoc passed the first control mechanism- the test of proximity of relationship- with relation to their son and while another plaintiff, Alexandra Penk’s relationship to her fiancé was sufficient for that test; all plaintiffs failed to pass the control mechanism for proximity of perception because they watched the events on TV.
What is the significance of this case?
The House of Lords clarified the meaning of primary and secondary victims. They also confirmed that the test of foreseeability is not sufficient for determining liability for people who are psychiatrically injured by the witnessing or hearing of their loved one’s injury.
It was made clear that there are three control mechanisms that secondary victims need to pass in order to recover damages for pure psychiatric harm. They are proximity of relationship, proximity in time and space and proximity of perception.
For a visual and audio summary of this case, watch this video.