Dulieu v White & Sons [1901]

What are the facts of the case?

The defendant’s servant unintentionally drove a pair horse van into the pub that the plaintiff who was pregnant at the time was working in. She suffered nervous shock and subsequently gave birth to a premature and disabled baby.

In the High Court’s King’s Bench, the court had to decide the following:

Was the driver negligent?

And if he was, did his negligence cause the plaintiff nervous shock which led to further bodily injury?

If the answer to question two was ‘yes’, could the plaintiff claim damages for these injuries or, were they too remote?

In response to the first question, the court said the defendant was negligent.

They said the real question was, ‘Could damages could be sought as a result of the negligence, if plaintiff did not incur physical damage, but mental injury?’

As the previous court had dismissed the claim for the baby being born disabled, this was not considered by the judges in the King’s Bench. However, the fact that the baby was born prematurely was considered in respect to this question.

What did the defendants argue?

The defendants argued that the damage was too remote. They relied heavily upon Victorian Railways v Commissioners (1888), arguing that no action for negligence could be brought if there was no immediate physical injury to the plaintiff.

In other words, the incident did not directly or immediately cause physical injury. It was the nervous shock the plaintiff suffered which led to the relevant physical injury and this could not lead to a cause of action.

What did the court decide?

The plaintiff won. Her claim was not too remote. She was able to claim damages. The court did not follow the Privy Council’s decision in Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas (1888).

They followed the Irish Exchequer case of Bell v Great Northern Railway and decided that the plaintiff could recover in respect of the physical consequences of ‘nervous shock’ because of ‘reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself’.

What is the significance of this case?

The case confirmed that claims could sometimes be made for physical injuries caused as a result of nervous shock. Kennedy J said obiter that liability in these cases- cases brought for pure psychiatric harm not consequential harm- was limited to the requirement that there ‘must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of personal injury to oneself’. Thus, indicating that only primary victims not secondary victims would be able to recover damages in these types of cases.

Watch a summary of the case here.